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BOOK REVIEWS
“A WAR NOT YET FINISHED”
Ricks, Thomas E. The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq,
2006–2008. New York: Penguin, 2009. 394pp. $27.95
Thomas Ricks begins his latest chroni-
cle of the American strategic experience
in Iraq where he left off in Fiasco
(2006). In this account, Ricks uses his
familiar journalistic approach to de-
scribe how the civilian and military
leaders arrived at a change of policy and
strategy, commonly known as “the
surge,” in the war in Iraq. Ricks’s new
book appears to be more even in its
treatment of the leaders and the new
strategy than was Fiasco, with its prose-
cutorial tone. In spite of his upbeat as-
sessment of the American leaders,
however, Ricks ends this volume with
measured, if not pessimistic, projec-
tions for the future of Iraq.
Ricks covers familiar developments de-
scribed in Bob Woodward’s The War
Within, but he sheds new light on the
role of General Ray Odierno in pushing
for a change of strategy. Specifically,
Ricks recounts how Odierno corre-
sponded with his mentor and old boss,
retired general Jack Keane, to change
the “bridging strategy” then advocated
by Generals George Casey and John
Abizaid, and by the Pentagon leader-
ship. Not wanting to lose this war on
his watch, Odierno relied on Keane and
American Enterprise Institute strategist
Fred Kagan to change the direction of
the strategy in Iraq. They sought to
change the strategy of transitioning
power to corrupt and impotent Iraqi se-
curity forces into a new strategy of pro-
viding security for the Iraqi people. The
most remarkable aspect of Ricks’s story
is that this change in strategy developed
outside the president’s designated Na-
tional Security team and against the
recommendations of the Joint Chiefs
and the Iraq Study Group. According to
Ricks, Keane and Kagan clearly led the
way in the White House to get more
American combat forces into Iraq.
Ricks describes in some detail how
events in al Anbar province greatly influ-
enced a key aspect of the new strategy.
The Marines’ experience with the recon-
ciliation movement, or “Sunni Awaken-
ing,” of tribal leaders in al Anbar in 2005
and 2006 was the pivotal instance show-
ing how to turn former belligerents into
potential allies. In effect, the American
forces in al Anbar were already practic-
ing the tactics and techniques of the new
counterinsurgency (COIN) manual
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recently published by General David
Petraeus and a Fort Leavenworth team.
Ricks highlights how Odierno adopted
this new COIN approach in the em-
ployment of the five surged combat bri-
gades. Instead of putting all the
additional forces into central Baghdad
to “secure the people,” Odierno de-
ployed them into the fractious “Bagh-
dad belts.” During the surge, American
troops would not only live among the
Iraqi people in “joint security stations”
and combat outposts but also target the
insurgent lines of operations running
from Syria and Iran into central
Baghdad.
Overall, this appears to be a balanced
narrative of a war not yet finished. In
the last section Ricks considers the last-
ing effects of the “surge” strategy pur-
sued in 2006–2008. He winds up with a
discussion of that famous Petraeus
question of 2003, “How does this end?”
Ricks notes that perhaps this war does
not end. Clausewitz declared, “Even the
ultimate outcome of war is not always
to be regarded as final”; in Ricks’s view,
that will be true of the outcome of this
war.
JON SCOTT LOGEL
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Naval War College
Deudney, Daniel H. Bounding Power: Republican
Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2007.
391pp. $17.96
Paradoxically, this is one of the most
innovative yet least original books
written in the past decade on the the-
ory and practice of international rela-
tions. Daniel Deudney synthesizes a
broad understanding of the history of
Western political theory with an
equally broad study of contemporary
world politics to recover what he calls
“republican security theory.” He sees
this theory as having developed from
the Greek polis through the Italian Re-
naissance to the Enlightenment (in the
thought of Montesquieu especially), to
the American founding to the present,
and as having important implications
for nuclear proliferation and disarma-
ment in the “global village” of our
time. Deudney demonstrates conclu-
sively that the leading schools of inter-
national relations today—realism and
liberal internationalism—are both in-
tellectual “fragments” of this older tra-
dition, with the fragmentation often
obstructing practical efforts to recon-
cile security from external threats to
the liberty of public citizens and pri-
vate individuals.
Such a reconciliation is the raison d’être
of republican security theory and prac-
tice, though as Deudney shows, the via-
bility of the endeavor depends on
learning much from the school of hard
knocks. Twenty-five hundred years ago,
the members of the Delian League
sought to secure their independence
from Persia by following the leadership
of Athens, but in so doing they jumped
from the frying pan of external anarchy
into the fire of Athenian imperialism.
The Roman republic, if only because its
more inclusive approach to citizenship
enabled it to grow stronger as it ex-
panded, proved more successful at unit-
ing external security with internal
liberty than had Athens or the Delian
League, but ultimately it got too big.
Generals like Caesar, Pompey, and Au-
gustus were able to count on the private
loyalty of soldiers to help them establish
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despotic power on the ruins of republi-
can freedom. Studying this checkered
past with care, both Niccolò Machiavel-
li (whom some see as the founder of re-
alism) and Charles de Secondat, Baron
de Montesquieu (who could be consid-
ered a founder of liberal international-
ism), sought ways to combine the
security advantages of large empires
with the freedom (from military rule
especially) of healthy republics.
What practical use might this mixed
success of republican security theory be
today? Clearly, it lies at the origins of
the two grandest experiments in inter-
national cooperation of the twentieth
century––the League of Nations and the
United Nations. Rather than view the
less-than-complete success, and some-
times patent failure, of either as proof
that republican security theory has
reached a point of diminishing returns,
Deudney concludes with an analysis of
how early experiments in nuclear arms
control might suggest ways to apply re-
publican security theory to avoid the
danger of nuclear violence while pre-
serving individual freedom. In this re-
spect, Deudney appears to have more in
common with contemporary liberal in-
ternationalists than with today’s real-
ists, but he has no patience with charges
that his project is utopian. It has
worked in the past, and it continues to
work in the American union. With
enough intelligence and determination,
he argues, it might be the only practica-
ble solution to the global problems of
this century, which no single state can
address on its own. In making this
claim, Deudney has gone, like the
starship Enterprise (which served a fed-
eration of republics!) where few today
have gone before, to help found a new
discipline, one that might be called
“world political theory.” At a time
when U.S. maritime strategy has be-
come ever more concerned with the
security of the global system, this is a
book that thoughtful strategists will
need to read again and again.
KARL WALLING
Naval War College
Coicaud, Jean-Marc. Beyond the National Inter-
est. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of
Peace Press, 2007. 297pp. $19.95
It should come as little surprise that
Jean-Marc Coicaud, a noted French
scholar with extensive experience at the
United Nations, sees the need for a fun-
damental change in the way the inter-
national system addresses its most
pressing security problems. He be-
moans the fact that “narrow national
interests” have made prompt, effective
multilateral peacekeeping interventions
on behalf of humanitarian needs very
difficult. In his Beyond the National In-
terest he offers prescriptions to alleviate
this situation.
This short book covers in some detail
the history of international humanitar-
ian interventions since the 1990s, in
search of trends and lessons learned.
The author conveys a sense of optimism
that the end of the Cold War presented
a perfect opportunity for universal hu-
man values to displace traditional val-
ues according to which sovereignty was
sacrosanct and nation-states responded
only to direct external threat. He opti-
mistically proclaims that NATO was
moving forward progressively in this
direction.
Unfortunately, his detailed historical
examples consistently belie this
B O O K R E V I E W S 1 5 3
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optimism, as some protagonist (nor-
mally the United States) always allows
its conduct to be driven by the atavistic
notions of sovereignty and physical se-
curity. In fact, the United States (partic-
ularly the last Bush administration)
comes out as the book’s principal vil-
lain, although the Clinton administra-
tion also takes its hits. Owing to its
superpower status, the United States is
directly involved in every incident in
which humanitarian intervention is a
possible course of action, and its
responses never meet the author’s high
standards.
While Coicaud’s facts and historical
analysis are correct and fundamentally
sound, a reader might get the impres-
sion that it is only a matter of time be-
fore the entire world is persuaded to see
the responsibility to protect––the inter-
national community sending in forces
to protect the citizens of an offending
country––much as an enlightened Eu-
ropean does now. I am certain that
Coicaud is buoyed by the advent of the
Obama administration in hopes that
the United States will eventually join in
this enlightenment. Unfortunately, his
optimism is probably misplaced, for
two reasons. First, none of today’s
emergent powers (China, Russia, India,
or Brazil) have been proponents of
what the author calls “conditional” sov-
ereignty. If anything, they hold dearly
their sovereignty and support this right
for other nation-states. The second
point forces us to focus on the title of
the book.
That is, national interest is the real cul-
prit. As long as nations constitute the
world’s central cast, there is little like-
lihood that it will achieve Coicaud’s
idealistic standards. Even his recom-
mendations to strengthen the United
Nation’s peace-enforcement and
humanitarian roles are largely bureau-
cratic and peripheral, suggesting that
the author is also aware of the funda-
mental resistance. As long as the UN
remains nationally based, the likeli-
hood that its members will be driven
by “supranational” interests will be
slim. Indeed, simply getting beyond the
national interest is not enough. The in-
ternational community must adopt su-
pranational interests or it will forever
be hampered by the primacy of “secu-
rity issues” and “self-centered nation-
alism,” which, unfortunately for
Coicaud, is likely to be a long time
coming.
Although a welcome addition to those
advocating for the rights of individuals
over those of nation-states, the book
unfortunately fails to deal meaningfully
with the real obstacles to the ideal. Fur-
ther, since much of this book is a dia-
tribe against the Bush administration,
its salience is increasingly historical.
TOM FEDYSZYN
Naval War College
Cohen, William A. A Class with Drucker: The Lost
Lessons of the World’s Greatest Management
Teacher. New York: AMACOM, 2008. 248pp.
$24.95
Krames, Jeffrey A. Inside Drucker’s Brain. New
York: Penguin, 2008. 257pp. $24.95
Peter Drucker, considered the father of
modern management, died in 2005 at
the age of ninety-five. For six decades
he consulted with industry and govern-
ment leaders and taught at New York
University and the Claremont Graduate
School of Management, publishing
thirty-nine books, including one on
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Japanese art. Drucker’s principles of
leadership, responsibility, management,
and strategy transcended organizational
mission, whether for-profit, nonprofit,
or military.
It is not surprising that several books
about Drucker have been published
since his death. One interesting one, A
Class with Drucker, is by Bill Cohen.
Cohen graduated from West Point and
was a PhD student of Drucker’s. He
served as a major general in the Air
Force reserves, worked in the defense
industry, and remained in touch with
Drucker for thirty years. The goal of
Cohen’s book is to share lessons from
Drucker’s classroom.
Peter Drucker was an exceptional
thinker and writer. His perspectives on
organizations were refreshingly unor-
thodox and expressed with piercing
logic. Drucker drew deeply from global
history and economics. Although he
was an academic, his audience was the
practitioner. Ethics and social responsi-
bility themes permeated his writing and
teaching. Many concepts that are now
part of everyday organizational vocabu-
lary originated with Peter Drucker, such
as management by objectives, knowl-
edge workers, decentralized manage-
ment, and strategic leadership in
business.
Two things make Cohen’s book inter-
esting. One is Drucker’s influence as his
mentor and teacher, and the other is his
own military perspective. Cohen inter-
weaves Drucker’s concepts of leader-
ship, strategy, ethics, and professional
development with his own military edu-
cation and experiences, often adding
candid personal reflection and revealing
anecdotes.
One revelation emerged during a class
session when a student asked Drucker
how he got started as a “management
consultant.” Drucker talked about be-
ing mobilized for World War II, armed
only with a PhD and experience in eco-
nomics. Drucker’s job classification in
the Army was “consultant,” but neither
he nor his colonel had any idea what
that entailed. Drucker started asking the
colonel about the group’s goals and re-
sources, and a few days later he went
back with a report of priorities and al-
ternatives. As it turned out, the group
was quite successful in its mission.
Cohen affirms that Drucker’s principles
of strategy and leadership are tightly
coupled to personal responsibility, and
he elaborates on the distinctive chal-
lenges between tactical and strategic de-
cisions for the military leader. The
strategic leader must persistently ask
the right questions; as Drucker would
state, “You can’t get there unless you
know where there is.” To be a strategic
leader, one must avoid developing
strategy by formula and instead devote
time to self-development by expanding
one’s knowledge and perspective.
Drucker’s advice for professional devel-
opment was to “read, write, listen and
teach . . . and strive for expertise in an
area outside your profession.”
Drucker lectured his students about
what to do, not how to do it. Cohen
sometimes takes a Drucker principle
and expounds on it using his own
“boilerplate” advice. Some of the elabo-
rations are unremarkable, but others
are a genuine fusing of Drucker’s influ-
ence with the author’s experience.
Another book on the subject published
about the same time is Inside Drucker’s
Brain, by Jeffrey Krames, a seasoned
writer who has written extensively on
B O O K R E V I E W S 1 5 5
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General Electric’s Jack Welch. In 2002
he published a work on Donald
Rumsfeld and his leadership style.
Krames’s new book draws on a six-hour
interview that took place in Drucker’s
home about two years before he died, as
well as upon Drucker’s writings. As
Krames sat down for the first (and ap-
parently only) interview, Drucker men-
tioned that Jack Welch had sat in that
same upholstered chair twenty years
earlier, just before Welch became the
legendary CEO of General Electric.
The goal of Krames’s book is to capture
the relevance of Drucker’s most impor-
tant management philosophies and
strategies. Reading this book, one gets
the sense that the author wants to en-
sure that Drucker’s contribution to
management knowledge does not
diminish with time.
His concern has merit. Drucker’s career
path was varied and unconventional, so
he was never really viewed as a true aca-
demic, especially by other academics.
Krames points out that although
Drucker had a seminal influence on
such leaders as Welch, Tom Peters, Jim
Collins, Michael Dell, Andy Grove, and
Bill Gates, Drucker is rarely referenced
in management textbooks. Perhaps one
reason is that Drucker was not a
self-promoter. You will not find a
Drucker Consulting Group, spin-off
publications, or Drucker training work-
shops. Drucker declared, “My aim has
never been academic, that is, to be rec-
ognized; it has always been to make a
difference.”
Like Cohen, Krames centers on leader-
ship, strategy, and social responsibility,
covering much of the same ground.
However, Krames has more of a busi-
ness and historical perspective than
Cohen, who writes from a military van-
tage point. Each book makes its own
unique contribution. For instance,
Krames’s extensive insights into Gen-
eral Electric amplify the little-known
influence Drucker had on the company
and its iconic leaders. On the question
of whether leaders are born or made,
Drucker said that some leaders are nat-
urals (like Welch) but that there are not
enough of them—so leaders have to be
made! That is one of the reasons why
General Electric has done so well; the
company has been developing leaders at
its renowned Crotonville Training Cen-
ter since the 1950s. Drucker was a
founder of Crotonville, along with
Ralph Cordiner, General Electric’s CEO
at the time. For readers interested in
where great leaders get their ideas, the
book’s chapter entitled “Drucker on
Welch” is quite interesting.
However, it seems presumptuous to say
that after only one interview and a few
letters, the author got “inside Drucker’s
brain.” The reader is left wondering
why there was no second or third
interview.
HANK KNISKERN
Naval War College
Wukovits, John. One Square Mile of Hell: The Bat-
tle for Tarawa. New York: New American Library,
2006. 320pp. $15
One Square Mile of Hell relates the story
of the November 1943 battle for the
Tarawa Atoll from the personal level of
the Marines who endured this remark-
ably bloody fight. John Wukovits makes
use of firsthand interviews with veter-
ans of the operation, while also citing
personal letters and diaries. The result
1 5 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
6
Naval War College Review, Vol. 62 [2009], No. 3, Art. 11
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss3/11
is a personal history that draws the
reader into the lives of the corpsmen,
privates, lieutenants, and colonels who
grimly made their way across the
central Pacific.
As events unfold, Wukovits traces the
lives of several Marines as their paths
converge on Tarawa. The marriage pro-
posals and strong family ties ominously
set the stage for the tragedies that
would follow, although the general his-
torical discussion of the war leading up
to Tarawa is at times made awkward by
the intermixed personal story lines.
The assault on Betio, a strip of sand and
coconut trees two miles long and half a
mile wide, became a bloody slugfest.
There was little room to hide or maneu-
ver on the island, and the frontal as-
saults by the Marines produced
unprecedented casualty ratios. As a bat-
talion commander emphasized to his
men, there were two choices: move for-
ward or die. Complicating the opera-
tion was the fact that amphibious
planners had utilized outdated charts
and inadequate tide tables to determine
water levels over the island’s outer reefs,
resulting in numerous groundings and
unnecessary exposure to enemy fire. Af-
ter three days of brutal, hand-to-hand
fighting, the Marines subdued the
Japanese defenders and claimed a costly
victory.
A common theme of the accounts is the
incredibly adverse battle conditions.
The limited space and high casualties
resulted in a layer of death and carnage
over the entire island. The equatorial
sun and legions of flies added to the
misery, but it was the smell of death
and decay that lingered in one’s mind.
“The smell was inescapable,” wrote a
correspondent; “it evoked instant and
nightmarish memories. . . . Betio was
nothing but stink and death.”
Besides being a testament to the coura-
geous leadership and fighting spirit of
the Marine Corps, the Tarawa opera-
tion raised questions in 1943 regarding
the degree of force that should be em-
ployed in war. The issue has been con-
tinually debated following the dropping
of atomic bombs on Japan, and it is still
argued today in connection with harsh
interrogation techniques used on
suspected terrorists.
Time reporter Robert Sherrod, who ac-
companied the Marines during the
Betio landing, struggled to reconcile
what he saw at Tarawa with the clean,
edited version of war presented to the
American home front. “Americans,” he
wrote, “are not prepared psychologi-
cally to accept the cruel facts of war.”
Sherrod’s observation makes One
Square Mile of Hell poignant indeed for
Americans today.
While it is noble to memorialize the
courage and sacrifice of the Marines at
Tarawa, it is equally important to re-
mind ourselves that victory comes at a
steep price. Sherrod regarded the car-
nage of Tarawa as “the most haunting
memory of World War II.” Indeed, the
story of Tarawa should haunt all
Americans.
RONALD R. SHAW, JR.
Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College
Fischer, David Hackett. Champlain’s Dream: The
European Founding of North America. New York:
Simon and Schuster, 2008. 834pp. $40
David Hackett Fischer writes of Samuel
de Champlain, who founded French
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Quebec four hundred years ago, that
“[Champlain] wrote thousands of pages
about what he did, but only a few words
about who he was.” It is well for our
own and future generations that
Fischer, in his Champlain’s Dream, has
now splendidly written about both the
admirable man and his remarkable
deeds. In this, another of his signature
and wonderfully readable narrative his-
tories (he is also the author of the ma-
jestic 1989 Albion’s Seed and the
Pulitzer Prize–winning Washington’s
Crossing of 2004), Fischer presents
Champlain as a master mariner, ex-
plorer, cartographer, ethnologist, cour-
tier, and soldier, but above all as a
deeply humane person in a world that
was anything but. Fischer writes that
Champlain “had a dream of humanity
and peace in a world of cruelty and vio-
lence. He envisioned a new world as a
place where people of different cultures
could live together in amity and
concord. This became his grand design
for North America.”
Champlain pursued this grand design
with astounding skill, perseverance, and
stamina, crossing the North Atlantic
twenty-seven times between 1599 and
1635 without losing a single major ship.
In New France (now Canada) he faced
cold, isolation, hunger, mutiny, corrup-
tion, war, and other hardships almost
beyond imagining. Among his many ac-
complishments, what stands out is per-
haps the balanced relationship that
Champlain formed with the indigenous
people. He had an insatiable curiosity
about the complex Indian cultures he
encountered and was genuinely inter-
ested in what he could learn from them,
an attitude that resulted in numerous
long-lasting alliances, respect, and trust.
On the eastern side of the Atlantic, he
faced a far different but equally treach-
erous environment. It took deft and
constant lobbying within the French
court to maintain royal support for his
daring enterprise in the New World.
Champlain did all this, Fischer explains,
not for conquest or riches but “to in-
crease the power and prosperity of
France, to spread the Christian faith, to
learn more about the world, and to
bring together its many people in a
spirit of humanity.” Fischer is scrupu-
lous in his research and in distinguish-
ing established fact from assertions
based on less-certain accounts. His
book includes sixteen appendixes ad-
dressing such diverse subjects as Cham-
plain’s separate voyages, the essay he
wrote on leadership in 1632, his ships
and boats, and the Indian nations in
Champlain’s world. There are also
thirty-six pages of “memories of Cham-
plain” that explore images and interpre-
tations of the man from 1608 to 2008.
Fischer concludes his commanding
work with 161 pages of notes, bibliogra-
phy, and credits.
Fischer’s prodigious research persuaded
him that Champlain was a dreamer,
who imagined “a New World where
people lived at peace with others unlike
themselves.” In this grand book Fischer
superbly tells the story of Champlain
the man, who surmounted the chal-
lenges he faced with fairness, prudence,
and faithfulness to his dream.
WILLIAM CALHOUN
Naval War College
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